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attending to and appraising critically important principles, theories and values for
exploration, assessment and judgment, will find material in Wain’s work that will
be of signal assistance to them in their studies, research and writing. It is for their
use that Wain has been working.
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There is an abundance of thought-provoking themes in Kenneth Wain’s 
 
The Learning
Society in a Postmodern World
 
, and in a short colloquium contribution such as this
I can address only a selected few of these, and then only in an initial way. I’ll
proceed by commenting first of all on the historical context in which the author
places the book’s arguments and critiques. Then I will take up just a few issues that
have struck myself as particularly significant, and offer a few points of my own on
these. In conclusion, I will comment on what Wain discerns as the best prospects
for educational action in our times.
A welcome feature of the book is the historical review in the first two chapters
of the fortunes of the lifelong education movement since the late 1960s. That
review underlines the movement’s democratic and humanist character in its early
years, calling attention to an informal but influential sponsorship of lifelong education
at that time by bodies like UNESCO. This is contrasted with the economic-
vocationalist character of the lifelong 
 
learning
 
 movement which the lifelong education
movement subsequently became, particularly under the auspices of bodies like the
European Commission and the OECD. The recasting of ideas and realignment of
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energies that brought about this major shift are perceptively traced by Wain, with
frequent reference to the major policy documents that helped to promote that shift,
thereby dispossessing a broader international constituency of practitioners, scholars
and politicians of an effective voice in policymaking. In addition to a shift in
substance, Wain also calls attention to a shift in philosophical ethos—from a broadly
utopian one embodying the aspirations of a democratic modernity in the 1960s and
1970s, to an essentially pragmatist one in the 1980s and eventually to one expressing
key features of a fragmented postmodern condition, governed by the values of
consumerism and by a rule of performativity. He correctly points out that the
‘reassuring sprinklings of social democracy’ in the official ‘learning society’ documents
of the nineties (e.g. Cornelis 
 
et al
 
., 1994; European Commission, 1995) do not
alter the fact that the production of such documents, and of policies based on
them, mark the demise of the lifelong education movement as an educational one.
The detailed investigations in Wain’s opening chapters furnish valuable insights into
how an inspirational idea can get distorted, or harnessed to contrary purposes,
amid the crooked paths of history. These investigations also provide some salutary
lessons for how policies and practices in lifelong education might be advanced in
the future.
Among the major philosophers with whose arguments Wain engages at length are
Alasdair MacIntyre, Jürgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, John Dewey and Michel
Foucault. I will confine myself to a few points in his engagements with MacIntyre
and Foucault. The most familiar criticism of MacIntyre’s often-cited ‘idea of an
educated public’ (MacIntyre, 1987) is that it restricts that public to a minority: an
intelligentsia conscious of its own standing and responsibilities in society, sharing
a broadly similar background of assumptions and informed convictions which arise
largely from being schooled in a broadly similar range of canonical texts. From his
readings of MacIntyre’s later works, and particularly 
 
Dependent Rational Animals
 
(MacIntyre, 1999), Wain shows however that MacIntyre’s views on education are
not as exclusive as this. The ‘educated public’ idea, Wain argues, can be seen as
just one element of ‘MacIntyre’s learning community’. The latter, Wain continues,
‘which is small and local and more intimate and morally and intellectually coherent
than a local society, has three kinds of members: educated, independent practical
reasoners, and dependent. The first reason about ends, the second about means
and the third reason through the proxy of the other members’, (p. 133). Although
one could argue with the neatness of the demarcations drawn here (MacIntyre’s
more so than Wain’s), the prominence now given to independent practical reasoning
by MacIntyre (and by Wain) is the more important issue to note. The educational
import of independent practical reasoning, Wain points out, can be seen in
MacIntyre’s suggestion that this capability lies potentially within everyone’s grasp
(p. 133). It is not something confined to a minority of intellectuals. Wain sees a
philosophically fresh warrant, or mandate, for ‘lifewide’ learning here, specifically
in the ‘collective responsibility of the community to ensure the lifelong education
of its members’ (p. 132). How far this warrant can extend remains questionable
however, if, as MacIntyre seems to hold, such reasoning will be about means as
distinct from ends. Wain, as I understand him, includes ends as well as means
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under independent practical reasoning and rightly sees a significance in this
warrant that MacIntyre’s limitations on such reasoning might not have even conceived.
Now there is, in my view, a necessity to distinguish between the properly educational
practices called for to pursue such a warrant fruitfully, and the incisive political
arts required to secure the scope and freedom to engage in such practices. The
distinction is not a watertight one of course, any more than is the distinction, say,
between medical practice (as conducted by medical practitioners) and the politics
of medicine (as conducted by medical practitioners and many others). But the
point of the distinction between educational practice and a politics of education is
no less real, though considerably less obvious, than in the case of medicine.
 
 The
Learning Society in a Postmodern World
 
 carries out intensive investigation of political
arts, including those involved in a politics of hope and a politics of suspicion.
Despite Wain’s probing explorations of educationally relevant points in central
works of recent contemporary Western philosophy, I haven’t been able to discern
in the book a distinction like the one I have just drawn: one that would mark
education as an undertaking that is distinct from politics, or at least with a politics
of its own distinct kind and with its own arena; a politics arising primarily from
the deliberate cultivation of learning over a sustained period, focusing on the
actions that help or hinder such cultivation, and on the justification of such actions.
Whether there is here a contrast of emphasis or a more substantial difference
between Kenneth Wain’s position and my own, including our appraisals of MacIntyre’s
import for education, remains to be seen, but it may be worth offering a few
comments to open up this issue. In the distinction I’ve drawn in the previous
paragraph I’m consciously turning away from a recurring point of controversy in
MacIntyre’s account of things. That point is his tendency to cherish as a virtue the
capacity of a particular community of learners, or tradition of learning, to engage
in conflict with ‘rival’ communities or traditions. Whatever its merits in other
arenas, I believe such an agonistic impulse beclouds the more central issues in
education, particularly if it occupies the foreground of thought and discourse. John
Dewey sought to show to a largely unheeding world, most succinctly in his late
work 
 
Experience and Education
 
 (1938), that there are kinds of teaching and learning
that distinguish experience which is genuinely educational from that which is not.
The heart of my own argument is that such kinds of teaching and learning (and
their wide diversity still reveals a detectable family resemblance) earn the right for
education to be called a practice with an integrity of its own. MacIntyre’s insistence
that teaching is not a practice, that it is merely a means (Dunne & MacIntyre, 2002),
concludes otherwise. This conclusion separates means from ends in interpersonal
actions; a separation which astute educators intuitively see as perilous, even foolhardy.
The conclusion also fits smoothly with a paternalistic view that teachers are troopers,
without a share in the kinds of decision-making entrusted to leaders. I’ll leave that
issue for now.
Of all the authors he engages with, the figure to whom Kenneth Wain comes
closest in drawing his own conclusions is Michel Foucault (pp. 306–320). More
precisely, this is the late Foucault who, while not renouncing his earlier emphasis
on resistance, combat and suspicion, now gives a new importance to positive human
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agency; particularly through the cultivation of qualities such as self-mastery (as
distinct from a normalised self), care of the self (including an ‘undisabling’ care
for others), and truth-telling (
 
parrhesia
 
). The late Foucault’s stance is characterised
by Wain as one of tactical anarchism: one that resists the urge to construct a
positive theory (either of government or of the learning society) and remains
similarly averse to the lure of utopias and ‘master narratives’. Foucault’s ‘imperative’
as Wain calls it, retains a critical focus on unmasking the workings of power,
particularly knowledge-as-power and the practices of learning that it institutionalises.
To say that there is something visionary in this imperative is to speak plainly, but
also perhaps to speak dangerously, and draw criticisms from postmodernists who
detect in any talk of vision in education either a delusion or a potentially oppressive
‘master narrative’. But undisabling doesn’t happen on its own. Neither does it
happen through commending it in philosophical writings. Anything like undisabling
involves practices—of certain kinds rather than others—that help to bring it about,
and to sustain it through youth, adulthood and old age. To be committed to the
undisabling of oneself and of others is to move vigilantly beyond critique and to
venture into arenas of practice; whether of politics, of education, or any other field
of action. It is to recognise moreover that different arenas require different capacities
and moral energies, not the least of which might be the capability to do battle with
some restraint when, to the best of one’s judgement, the occasion calls for it.
Of course the fallibility of such judgement stands ever in need of perceptive
insights. 
 
The Learning Society in a Postmodern World
 
 is replete with these and richly
repays successive readings. At the same time, recalling a point I made briefly above,
practices that are educational before they are anything else require of course incisive
understanding and critically informed judgement. But they also stand continually
in need of something further; not of theory to be sure, but of suggestive ideas and
memorable examples. These might be discovered, sometimes in unexpected ways, among
practitioners themselves, especially in whose practice inspirations remain thoroughly
alive. More painstakingly, they may also be yielded by a philosophical literature
that is often, and rather myopically, decried as ‘consensualist’ at present—namely
the philosophical literature on dialogue. But that is work for another occasion.
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